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WHY THE SEC FAILED: REGULATORS
AGAINST REGULATION
Norman S. Poser *
INTRODUCTION
In June 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission) marks its seventy-fifth birthday. The anniversary comes at a
time when the reputation and effectiveness of the agency are at their lowest
point in its history. This is especially sad because the SEC was known for
years as one of the finest, if not the finest, of the federal regulatory
agencies. Its effectiveness as the nation’s principal securities regulator was
a source of pride to its members and its employees and a source of comfort
to investors. Furthermore, it was thought to be incorruptible. Professor
William L. Cary, SEC Chairman in the early 1960s, attributed the
Commission’s success to the fact that “it does not give away property
rights, and has not actually engaged in the fixing of rates. . . . Nor is it an
arbiter between competitors . . . .” 1
Although Professor Cary’s observation is still largely true, the
Commission has been corrupted in ways that he probably never envisioned.
Two of the SEC’s most notorious failures came to light in 2008: the demise
of several of the largest investment banking firms under its regulatory care
and the SEC’s disregard of the warning signs that could have alerted it to
Bernard Madoff’s $50 billion Ponzi scheme. 2 These are only the most
recent results of a rot that set in several years earlier. Although several
partial explanations have been given for the SEC’s decline, including
budgetary problems and a fragmented regulatory system that has not kept
up with developments in the financial markets, the main reason for the
decline is that the Commission succumbed to the anti-regulatory climate of
recent years. Too many of its members just did not believe in regulation.
Other regulatory agencies also suffered from the same ill; but in view of the
SEC’s former excellence, its decline is particularly lamentable.
Ironically, there are close similarities between the state of the nation’s
securities markets and economy at the present time and at the time of the
SEC’s birth. In 1934, the country was in the worst depression in its history.
* Professor of Law Emeritus, Brooklyn Law School. Professor Poser served on the staff of
the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1961 to 1967 as a Senior Attorney on the Special
Study of Securities Markets and later as Assistant Director of the Division of Trading and
Markets. The author thanks Judy Cohn, James Fanto, Susan Poser, and David Silver for their
helpful comments on a draft of this article; however, the opinions expressed, and any errors, are
his own. He gratefully acknowledges the research and editing assistance of Anna Estrina, an
Executive Articles Editor of the Journal.
1. WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (McGraw-Hill, Inc.
1967).
2. Diana B. Henriques & Jack Healy, Madoff Goes to Jail After Guilty Pleas, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2009, at A1.
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Thirteen million people, representing 25 percent of the workforce, were
unemployed. 3 The Great Crash of 1929 and its aftermath, which wiped out
83 percent of the value of the stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE or Exchange), was still fresh in people’s minds. 4 True, in
early 2009 the country’s financial and economic situation is not as bad as it
was in 1934, but it is bad enough: the stock market has given up its gains of
the previous ten years, 5 and the economy is sliding into a deepening
recession, marked by sharply rising unemployment, foreclosures on homes,
and a decline in corporate profits.
The framers of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act or
Exchange Act) 6 saw a close connection between protecting investors and
maintaining a healthy economy. The introductory section of the 1934 Act
points out that “excessive speculation” affects the national welfare, with the
result that “the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to
burden the national credit.” 7 Therefore, securities transactions “are affected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for
regulation and control of such transactions.” 8 Today, after a speculative
binge in mortgage-backed securities has been followed by the collapse of
several investment banking firms and the outpouring of government funds
to save the economy from disaster, that statutory language seems eerily
prophetic.
In recent years, the SEC did not provide the regulation and control that
might have prevented the worst results of the speculative binge of the first
decade of the twenty-first century. Its failures were of two kinds. First,
succumbing to the deregulatory climate that pervaded the government since
the 1980s, the SEC dismantled crucial parts of the regulation established to
protect investors and the markets. Second, the SEC failed to detect and stop
widespread abuses by securities firms, costing investors billions of dollars.
This article will summarize the background of SEC regulation, describe
the most important of the SEC’s regulatory and enforcement failures,
attempt to ascertain the reasons for these failures, and recommend steps that
should be taken to reverse the SEC’s decline.

3. FREDRICK E. HOSEN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL 257 (McFarland &
Co., Inc. 1992).
4. Id.; ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 245
(Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1981).
5. In 2008 alone, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index fell by 38.5 percent. See E.S. Browning,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R1; see also Falling Backward: Stocks Finish 2008 Below Levels of
10 Years Ago, available at http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/WSJ_YE2008-LEDE.pdf.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
7. Exchange Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
8. Exchange Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
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I. BACKGROUND
The Exchange Act established the SEC to administer the federal
securities laws. 9 Its first chairman, Joseph Kennedy, was one of Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s few business supporters when he ran for President in 1932. The
appointment was not without its critics. One Cabinet member described
Kennedy, who had participated in some of the manipulative pools of the
1920s and early 1930s, as a notorious “stock market plunger.” 10 Roosevelt
answered the criticism by explaining: “Set a thief to catch a thief.” 11 To the
surprise of many, Kennedy turned out to be an effective chairman. He
organized the Commission and brought in talented staff members, including
two future Supreme Court Justices, William O. Douglas and Douglas’s
assistant, Abe Fortas. 12 A Yale Law School professor, Douglas was perhaps
the country’s foremost legal authority on corporate finance. He was tough,
brilliant, and politically astute. In 1937, Roosevelt appointed Douglas as
SEC Chairman. 13
Although his tenure lasted only nineteen months, Douglas made his
mark on the Commission. He reorganized and simplified the structure of the
country’s gas and electric utilities under the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935; 14 he began the regulation of the over-the-counter
market through the creation of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD, now renamed the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
or FINRA) under the Maloney Act of 1938; 15 and he imposed standards of
accounting and corporate finance on publicly-owned companies. It was
during Douglas’s tenure that Richard Whitney, a former president of the
NYSE, was caught embezzling from the NYSE’s fund for support of the
widows and children of deceased stock exchange members. 16 After SEC
hearings revealed that prominent members of the Exchange had known
about the thefts but had done nothing to stop them, Douglas used the
Whitney scandal as an opportunity to reform the NYSE’s governing
structure. He forced the Exchange to install a professional staff, headed by a
full-time administrator; the system became permanent and spread to all
other securities-industry self-regulatory organizations. 17
9. See Exchange Act, § 4. From 1933 to 1934, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), which
regulated distributions of securities, was administered by the Federal Trade Commission. With the
enactment of the Exchange Act in 1934, this responsibility was moved to the SEC.
10. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 105 (The Maple
Press Co., 2d ed. 1982).
11. KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 1933–37, at 369 (Random House, Inc.
1979).
12. SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 111.
13. Id. at 110.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1938).
16. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929, at 166–72 (1955).
17. Id.
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When Douglas left the SEC to begin his long tenure on the Supreme
Court, 18 his successor was Jerome Frank, a judicial philosopher and ardent
New Dealer who, like Douglas, was a passionate believer in the paramount
goal of the securities laws: protecting investors. 19 According to a
contemporary report, when brokers, underwriters, and lawyers “grumble
about red tape, . . . ambiguous rules, ‘arrogant & upstart personnel,’ . . .
Chairman Frank thinks of the 10,000,000-odd trusting U.S. investors,
resolves to guard them against needless shearing.” 20
With the coming of World War II, the SEC became a less relevant and
forceful agency. After Pearl Harbor, with the war to be won, the
administration no longer regarded securities regulation as a priority. In early
1942, the SEC was moved to Philadelphia to make room in Washington for
government departments directly concerned with fighting the war.
Surprisingly, the SEC was able to assist the war effort in at least one way: it
helped the War Department plan bombing missions by reviewing old SEC
filings of companies with factories in Germany in order to pinpoint their
location. 21
Nevertheless, the SEC was relegated to the government’s backburner,
where it remained for some time after the war. President Harry Truman had
little interest in securities regulation and tended to appoint SEC
commissioners who were cronies or persons to whom he owed political
favors. The SEC was considered so unimportant that it was not brought
back to Washington until 1948, three years after the war ended.
Ironically, it was during the SEC’s Philadelphia exile that perhaps the
most consequential event in the history of U.S. securities laws occurred. In
May 1942, investigators at the SEC’s Regional Office in Boston learned
that a company president was buying up shares from its shareholders
without telling them of the company’s much improved earnings. The
lawyers at the SEC’s Philadelphia headquarters could find no provision in
the Exchange Act to stop the fraudulent purchase (as opposed to the sale) of
securities. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act was designed to outlaw fraud
generally, but it could be used only if the SEC adopted a specific rule
implementing it.
Milton Freeman, a young SEC attorney, quickly drafted a short, simple
rule prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
18. Douglas served on the Court from 1939 to 1975, longer than any other justice. See
Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
19. Frank was the author of Law and the Modern Mind (1930), a landmark of twentiethcentury legal thought, in which he analyzed law from a psychoanalytical perspective. After
serving two years as SEC chairman, Frank was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
20. Intellectual on the Spot, TIME MAG., Mar. 11, 1940, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,789708-6,00.html.
21. Interview by Richard Phillips with Milton Kroll, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/oralhistories/interviews/kroll.php.
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He presented the rule to the five commissioners, who simply tossed the
paper on the table, saying they were in favor of it. One member simply
commented: “Well, we’re against fraud, aren’t we?” Before the sun set that
day, Rule 10b-5 was the law of the land. 22 In 1946, a federal district court
held that a violation of Rule 10b-5 could be the basis for a private right of
action. 23 As a result, the rule, which the SEC adopted in an almost absentminded way when the war and not securities regulation was on most
people’s minds, became the most important enforcement tool not only for
the SEC but also for defrauded investors. The enormous body of law
created by the SEC and the federal courts interpreting Rule 10b-5 is, as
Chief Justice William Rehnquist aptly (though without enthusiasm) stated,
“a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” 24
The long sleep of the SEC during the 1940s and 1950s came to an end
in 1961, when President John F. Kennedy appointed Columbia Law
Professor William L. Cary as Chairman. According to SEC historian Joel
Seligman, Cary “revitalized” the agency. 25 Soon after his appointment,
Cary obtained a special appropriation from Congress to establish the
Special Study of Securities Markets (Special Study), a two-year in-depth
review of the markets and their regulation. The report, issued by the Special
Study in 1963, led to two key changes. 26 First, legislation enacted in 1964
required companies whose shares were traded in the over-the-counter
(OTC) market to make the same disclosures as exchange-listed
companies. 27 Markets thrive on information, so when information became
available about OTC companies, the market exploded in size. Moreover, in
1971, the NASD established the Nasdaq market, which developed into an
electronic market for OTC stocks and eventually challenged the supremacy
of the NYSE. 28
Second, the Special Study found that the minimum rates of
commissions that the NYSE and other exchanges required members to
charge their customers were not only anticompetitive but were also
routinely circumvented. 29 The SEC forced the exchanges to gradually phase
out fixed commissions, and in 1975, all commission rates paid by customers
22. The story is told in Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium: Foreward, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1993). The Administrative Procedure Act, which requires administrative agencies to publish
proposed rules for comment before adopting them, was not in effect in 1942.
23. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
24. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
25. SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at ch. 10.
26. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95 (1963).
27. Securities Amendments Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l).
28. Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s National
Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 894–95 (1981).
29. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95 (1963).
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became subject to negotiation. 30 The resulting drastic reduction in
transaction costs, especially those paid by institutional investors, gave an
even greater stimulus to the markets; the average daily volume of share
trading on the NYSE rose more than one hundred-fold between 1975 and
2008—from eighteen million to about two billion shares. 31
Under the chairmanship of William Cary and his immediate successors,
the SEC achieved other key enforcement and regulatory results. In the 1961
case, In re Cady Roberts & Co., 32 the SEC held for the first time that the
use of non-public information in public securities markets on behalf of a
brokerage firm or its customers violated Rule 10b-5. This seminal decision
set the framework for all future insider-trading regulation. Following the
reasoning of Cady Roberts, the Second Circuit, in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 33 firmly established the Rule 10b-5 liability of corporate
insiders for misuse of inside information.
Using the authority given to it by the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975, the Commission facilitated the creation of a national market for
securities and the eventual automation of the securities markets. 34 During
the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, the SEC sought to keep abreast of
financial and technological developments by conducting studies and issuing
detailed reports on the growth of institutional investors, 35 the markets for
put and call options, 36 mutual fund regulation, 37 and corporate disclosure
requirements. 38 The Commission adopted rule changes that integrated the
disparate disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, thus

30. Id. at 898–901. The prohibition against fixing commission rates is Exch. Act § 6(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78(f)(e).
31. Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Euronext Announces Trading Volumes
for December 2008 (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1231412905832.html;
New
York
Stock
Exchange
Fact
Book,
Daily
Reported
Share
Volume,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/default.aspx?tabid=115.
32. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
33. See generally S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
34. Bowing to pressure from the NYSE, however, the SEC was unwilling to take the
necessary regulatory steps that would have converted the NYSE’s trading system from face-toface trading on a trading floor into an electronic market. As a result, the U.S. securities markets
lagged behind those of Europe in automation of securities trading. See Norman S. Poser, The
Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe: Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation,
22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 497, 524–28 (2001).
35. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY OF THE SEC, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-64 (1971).
36. 96TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1978).
37. 89TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH H.R. DOC. NO. 89-2337 (1966).
38. SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES UNDER THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT) (1969). See also Milton H. Cohen,
Truth in Securities’ Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
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simplifying the disclosures and reducing the regulatory costs to
companies. 39
Beginning in the 1980s, the SEC largely abandoned its role as an active
monitor of the markets. 40 Increasingly, it embraced the climate of
deregulation that has since pervaded the government. 41 The Commission’s
main focus changed from protecting investors to protecting the companies
and investment firms that the SEC was required to regulate. The SEC’s
change of direction was given an air of legitimacy by Chicago-school
laissez-faire scholars who argued, for example, that: (1) regulation of the
markets was not needed and was even harmful because the markets were
best left to regulate themselves, (2) mandatory corporate disclosure was
unnecessary because the profit motive would give companies a sufficient
incentive to make accurate disclosures, 42 and (3) regulation of market
manipulation was futile because manipulation is a myth. 43 Others argued
that the “moral hazards” that existed when commercial bankers engaged in
investment banking were also a myth. 44 The latter argument questioned the
basic premise of the Glass-Steagall Act, which mandated separation of these
39. For example, the SEC allowed seasoned companies to file short-form registration
statements when making public offers of securities under the 1933 Act, which incorporated by
reference the companies’ 1934 Act filings. It also adopted Regulations S-K, 17 CFR §229 (nonfinancial information), and S-X, 17 CFR §210 (financial information), which mandate uniform
disclosures to be used in 1933 Act registration statements offerings and 1934 Act annual reports
and proxy statements.
40. Nevertheless, under the chairmanships of Arthur Levitt (1993–2001) and William
Donaldson (2003–2005) the SEC did take important regulatory actions, including the adoption of
Regulation FD (concerning corporate disclosure) and Regulation NMS (concerning the national
market system). See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Historical Summary: Past
Chairmen and Commissioners, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2009).
41. For example, the Food and Drug Administration has been criticized for similarly failing to
protect consumers. See Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2008); Jennifer Wolsing, The
VIOXX Litigation: Disincentivizing Patient Safety Through Misdirected Tort Rules, 75 DEF.
COUNS. J. 217 (2008); Cameron Rhudy, How Congress May Have Failed Consumers with the
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 27 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 99 (2008).
42. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 682–84 (1984) (“If disclosure is worthwhile to investors, the
firm can profit by providing it.”). The Enron and WorldCom (and many other) corporate scandals
that came to light in the early 2000s may have weakened the force of this argument. For a
summary of the academic debate on the necessity for mandatory corporate disclosure, see COX,
HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES & MATERIALS 253–57 (5th ed.
2006).
43. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J.FIN. 343
(1999) (arguing that the anti-manipulative provisions of the Exchange Act were enacted under a
false assumption, because the stock pools of the 1920s and 1930s were not manipulative); Daniel
R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105
HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991) (arguing that the concept of manipulation should be abandoned
because manipulation cannot be satisfactorily defined).
44. See, e.g., FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION AND FINANCIAL
STABILITY 71 (1996) (“It is now widely accepted that Glass-Steagall restrictions are not necessary
to maintain bank soundness or financial stability.”).
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two activities, and provided a theoretical basis for the gradual erosion of the
Glass-Steagall Act and its ultimate repeal in 1999. 45
Wall Street and corporate America welcomed anti-regulatory theory
because it gave them a justification for the unfettered pursuit of profit,
unburdened by fear of guilt or government prosecution. Their attitude was
famously summed up by the fictional financier Gordon Gekko in the 1987
movie Wall Street, who said “greed is good.” The catastrophic events of
2007 and 2008 have, to say the least, cast a shadow of doubt over these
ideas.
II. WEAKENING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM
During the past decade, the SEC made important regulatory changes
that weakened the regulatory system and turned out to be a disaster for
investors, significantly contributing to the 2008 financial crisis. First, the
SEC exempted the largest investment banking firms from the minimum
capital requirements imposed on broker-dealers. 46 Second, the SEC
repealed a rule designed to prevent manipulative short selling of
securities. 47 At the same time, the Commission’s other deregulatory actions
included limiting shareholder access to the proxy voting system and
repeatedly urging the Supreme Court to limit investors’ ability to recover
their fraud losses by means of private lawsuits. 48 These four deregulatory
actions are discussed below.
45. Glass-Steagall is the name given to the National Banking Act of 1933. The Supreme Court
discussed the moral hazards that led to the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 in some
detail in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The revisionist theories that
supported repeal of Glass-Steagall are reviewed in NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO,
BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §2.02, at 8–9 (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2008).
46. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (2004).
47. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, 17 C.F.R. 242.201 (2007); See Release No. 34-55970
(2007).
48. The SEC made other deregulatory changes. In 1997, it reduced from two years to one year
the time that a purchaser of securities in an unregistered private placement was required to hold
the securities until they could be sold to the public. Revision of Holding Period Requirements in
Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 7390, 62 FR 9242 (Feb. 20, 1997). In 2007, it
reduced the required holding period to six months for securities of companies required to file
periodic reports with the SEC. Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 8869,
92 S.E.C. Docket 110 (Dec. 6, 2007). The purpose of the holding period is to ensure that the
private placement is not simply a conduit for an unregistered (and therefore illegal) public offering
of the securities. The SEC justified the changes by stating they would reduce the cost of capital,
particularly for small business issuers.
In 2005, the SEC loosened the rules governing public offerings, permitting some
companies to send investors publicity before the SEC had approved a registered offering for sale
to the public. The SEC stated that the rules “will provide more timely investment information to
investors without mandating delays in the offering process that we believe would be inconsistent
with the needs of issuers for timely access to capital.” Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act
Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,993, 70 FR 44,722, 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005).
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A. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The SEC’s net capital rule limits the leverage that a firm can take on in
its proprietary trading. 49 It is designed to protect the customers and creditors
of a brokerage firm from losses and delays that can occur when a firm fails.
Because broker-dealers typically have many outstanding contracts with
each other, the rule also provides essential protection for other brokerage
firms and the markets as a whole. The rule, as it was adopted in 1942, gave
an exemption from net capital requirements to member firms of stock
exchanges that had net capital rules of their own. 50 In 1975, after a financial
crisis in which several large NYSE firms failed, Congress amended the
Exchange Act to require the SEC to adopt minimum standards of financial
responsibility that would apply to all broker-dealers, and as a result the
SEC repealed the stock exchange exemption. 51
The net capital rule defines a firm’s net capital as its net worth (assets
minus liabilities) minus certain deductions from net worth (colloquially
referred to as “haircuts”), in order to arrive at a figure that approximates the
firm’s liquid net assets. 52 This is done by deducting from a firm’s net
worth: (1) all assets that cannot be readily converted into cash; and (2) a
percentage of the market value of the firm’s securities and other assets (to
reflect the market risk of owning these instruments). 53 This final figure
approximates the firm’s liquid net assets. 54 A broker-dealer must at all times
have net capital that meets either one of two alternative tests: 55 under the
first test, its aggregate indebtedness may not exceed fifteen times its net
capital; under the second (or alternative) test, its net capital must be at least
two percent of its customer-related receivables, i.e., debt owed to the firm
on margin accounts. 56 Most large brokerage firms choose to be regulated
under the alternative test, which provides an approximation of the firms’
securities business with the public.
In 2004, the SEC, with little publicity, effectively exempted the five
largest broker-dealer firms from the net capital rule. 57 Each of these firms

The pros and cons of these rule changes are not the issue. The point is that they were made
principally in the interests of issuing corporations and insiders, and they removed protections for
public investors.
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
50. 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(b)(1)(2).
51. See Exchange Act §15(c)(3)(A), 17 U.S.C. §78o(c)(3)(A); Exchange Act Release No.
11969 (Jan. 2, 1976).
52. POSER & FANTO, supra note 45, at §12.02.
53. Id. at §12.02[A].
54. Id.
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(i) (2008).
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii).
57. The firms were Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and
Morgan Stanley. Two other firms with broker-dealer affiliates, Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase,
were regulated by the Federal Reserve Board. SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT NO.
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was affiliated with an investment bank holding company (IBHC) that did
business in Europe as well as the United States. 58 In order to comply with a
European Union requirement that bank-affiliated brokerage firms be
regulated on a consolidated basis, the SEC amended the net capital rule to
establish “a voluntary, alternative method of computing deductions to net
capital for certain broker-dealers” that were part of consolidated supervised
entities. 59 Under the amended rule, an IBHC and its affiliated broker-dealer
could elect to become a consolidated supervised entity (CSE) that would be
supervised by the SEC under standards established by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision. 60 In return, the broker-dealer affiliate would be
exempted from the net capital rule. 61 All five firms opted to become CSEs.
The CSE program was enthusiastically greeted by the securities
industry when the SEC first proposed it in 2003. The Securities Industry
Association (SIA), the industry’s trade group, gushed: “While potentially
reducing regulatory capital requirements, the proposal would require groupwide adherence to rigorous risk-management practices and introduce
commission supervision of such practices, thereby reinforcing the financial
integrity of broker-dealers.” 62 The SEC, however, adopted the program
quietly, without even a press release. In announcing the change at an open
meeting of the Commission, Chairman William Donaldson said the SEC
would move its supervisory programs “from a command-and-control
regulatory model to a more efficient and goal-oriented approach . . . by
removing regulatory obstacles that tilt the playing field or impose needless
costs.” 63
Having allowed the largest firms under its regulation to opt out of its
key financial-responsibility rule, the SEC failed to monitor them. According
to Professor John Coffee:
[I]f the 2004 net capital rule changes were not intended to be
deregulatory, they worked out that way in practice. The ironic bottom line
is that the SEC unintentionally deregulated by introducing an alternative
net capital rule that it could not effectively monitor. . . . [A] team of only
three SEC staffers were assigned to each CSE firm (and a total of only 13

446-A, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM ix (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT].
58. Id.
59. See generally Exch. Act Release No. 49,830 (June 8, 2004).
60. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides international standards and
supervision
for
international
banking.
About
the
Basel
Committee,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm.
61. See Kenneth Marx, The Ebb and Flow of the Purpose for Liquidity Under the New Capital
Rule 20–23 (Fall 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
62. Broker-Dealers: SIA Welcomes Proposed CSE Framework, Allowance for Alternative
Capital Standards, SECURITIES LAW DAILY, (Mar. 5, 2004).
63. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, S.E.C., Opening Statement at April 28, 2004 Open
Meeting, (Apr. 28, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042804whd.htm.
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individuals comprised the SEC’s Office of Prudential Supervision and
Risk Analysis that oversaw and conducted this monitoring effort). 64

Virtually free of SEC regulation, the CSE firms took on enormous
risks, using extreme leverage to invest in mortgage-backed securities and
other exotic financial instruments. Their ratios of debt-to-equity ballooned:
Merrill Lynch’s (Merrill) to 28–1; Morgan Stanley’s to 33–1. 65 The SEC
“allowed such things as ‘hybrid capital instruments’ (much riskier than cash
or Treasuries), subordinated debt (ditto) and even deferred return of taxes,
to be counted as capital. The S.E.C. even allowed the banks to hold
securities ‘for which there is no ready market’ as capital.” 66 Furthermore,
the SEC’s Inspector General later reported that the SEC staff “became
aware of numerous potential red flags prior to Bear Stearns’ collapse,
regarding its concentration of mortgage-backed securities, high leverage,
shortcomings of risk management in mortgage-backed securities and lack of
compliance . . . , but did not take actions to limit these risk factors.” 67
The result of the SEC’s regulatory relaxation of the CSE firms,
combined with its failure to monitor them, was devastating. When a steep
drop in the housing market in 2007–2008 made many mortgage-backed
securities worthless, the CSE firms were faced with multi-billion-dollar
losses that threatened their viability or rendered them insolvent. 68 As a
result, Bear Stearns was taken over by JPMorgan Chase (with emergency
funding from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Lehman Brothers
(Lehman) filed for bankruptcy protection, Merrill was acquired by Bank of
America, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley transformed themselves
into bank holding companies with the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) as their
new principal regulator. 69
The SEC’s quietly adopted exemption of the CSE firms from the net
capital rule and its failure to monitor them were contributing factors to the
paralysis of the nation’s credit system and the deepening of the economic
recession. The SEC announced the end of the CSE program in September
2008. 70 SEC Chairman Christopher Cox admitted that the program was
“fundamentally flawed because investment banks could opt in or out of
supervision voluntarily.” 71

64. John C. Coffee, Jr., Missing in Action? Meltdown Raises Doubts About SEC Regulation,
N.Y.L.J. (2008).
65. See Marx, supra note 61, at 20–23.
66. Ben Stein, Wall Street, Run Amok, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, § BU, at 1.
67. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 57 at ix.
68. See id. at iv.
69. Id. at iv.
70. Press Release, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities
Program, Release No. 2008-230 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-230.htm.
71. Id.
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B. SHORT SELLING
A short sale is essentially a bet that the market for a security will
decline. Short sellers sell shares they do not own; they borrow the shares in
order to deliver them to the buyer, in the hope that they will be able to buy
the shares later at a lower price and return them to the lender. Short selling
is not in itself illegal or unethical, but it is a technique that can be used for
manipulative purposes. By repeatedly selling a company’s shares short (and
sometimes by simultaneously spreading negative rumors about the financial
state of the company) short sellers can depress the share price. In the 1920s
and 1930s, so-called “bear raiders” made a practice of using short selling
for this purpose. 72
The Exchange Act gave the SEC specific authority to regulate short
selling. 73 In 1938, “after several years of considering the effect of short
selling in a declining market,” 74 the SEC adopted a short selling rule. 75 The
rule, known as the “tick test,” prohibited a short sale at a price that was
either (1) below the last sale price or (2) at the last sale price if that price
was below that last different sale price. 76 For example, if the sequence of
the last two sale prices was $9.95, $10.00, a short sale could not be made
below $10.00; but if the sequence of the last two sale prices was $10.05,
$10.00, a short sale could not be made below $10.05. Thus, short sellers
could not move the price of a stock downward; they could sell short only in
a rising market. 77
In 2003, after the tick test rule had been in effect for sixty-five years,
the SEC began considering its repeal. The Commission conducted a pilot
program, in which the tick test was temporarily suspended. 78 The
Commission’s Office of Economic Analysis concluded that the price
restrictions of the tick test “do not appear necessary to prevent
manipulation.” 79 In 2007, “in order to modernize and simplify short sale
72. SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 9; see also Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exch. Act
Release No. 55970, 2007 WL 1880054, at n. 33 (June 28, 2007).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
74. S.E.C. Press Release No. 2007-114 (June 13, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-114.htm.
75. Rule 10a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2006), removed and reversed by Regulation SHO and
Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348 (July 3, 2007).
76. Id.
77. Of course, even in a declining market there are upticks (i.e., sales above the last sale price)
which give traders opportunities to make short sales, but the tick test limited their ability to force a
rapid price decline. For a more detailed description of the short selling rule, see LOUIS LOSS &
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 865–66 (5th ed. 2004).
78. SEC Press Release No. 2007-114 (June 13, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/207/2007-114.htm.
79. Id. The only academic who sent the SEC a comment on the proposed repeal of the tick test
wholeheartedly supported it. See James J. Angel, Letter dated Feb. 14, 2007, Associate Professor
of Finance at Georgetown University (“Eliminating the rule will remove an expensive compliance
headache that produced no benefit for investors.”).
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regulation,” 80 the Commission decided not only to repeal the rule but also
to prohibit any self-regulatory organization (SRO) from adopting or
maintaining a tick test of its own. 81 The NYSE, while supporting repeal of
the rule, “noted its concern about unrestricted short selling during periods
of unusually rapid and large market declines,” which had not happened
during the period of the pilot study. 82 The NYSE therefore suggested that
SROs be permitted to impose price restrictions on short selling if
necessary. 83 The SEC rejected this suggestion and adopted the rule change
as originally proposed. 84
The folly of the SEC’s action was soon made clear. In the market crash
of 2008, the conditions that led to adoption of the tick test returned, but
without the protection of the rule. According to the head of one securities
firm:
Investors have now been whipsawed by what appears to be manipulative
trading, what we used to call ‘bear raids,’ which drive stock prices down
without warning and at breakneck speed. . . . The SEC has an opportunity
to make a real difference in helping to control future market stability and
restore confidence in the fairness of our capital markets. But the SEC has
been strangely silent as the crisis has worsened. 85

The financier George Soros was even more critical:
Lehman, AIG and other financial institutions were destroyed by bear raids
in which the shorting of stocks and buying of CDS [collateralized debt
securities] amplified and reinforced each other. Unlimited shorting was
made possible by the 2007 abolition of the uptick rule (which hindered
bear raids by allowing short-selling only when prices were rising). The
unlimited selling of bonds was facilitated by the CDS market. Together,
the two made a lethal combination. 86

It took the bankruptcy of Lehman, a Wall Street firm founded in 1850,
for the SEC to take any remedial action. After announcing a second-quarter
loss of $2.8 billion in June 2008, the firm fought a running battle with short
sellers, whom it accused of spreading rumors to drive down the price of the

80. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg.
36,348, 36,348 (July 3, 2007).
81. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg.
36,348, 36,348.
82. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg.
36,348, 36,350.
83. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg.
36,348, 36,350.
84. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg.
36,348, 36,352.
85. Charles R. Schwab, Restore the Uptick Rule, Restore Confidence, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
2008, at A17.
86. George Soros, The Game Changer, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at 8.
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company’s stock. 87 In September 2008, Lehman announced additional huge
losses and filed for bankruptcy, a step that is widely thought to have
contributed to the crisis of confidence and the freezing of the credit
markets, “forcing governments around the globe to take steps to try to calm
panicked markets.” 88 After Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, the SEC banned all
short sales in financial stocks, a step that might not have been needed if the
tick test had been in place in 2008. 89
C. SHAREHOLDER PROXY ACCESS
Because of the widespread ownership of corporate shares, voting of
these shares is normally done by proxy. 90 In the “belief that fair corporate
suffrage is an important right that should attach to every corporate security
bought on a public exchange,” 91 Congress enacted Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act, 92 which authorizes the SEC to adopt rules governing the
solicitation of proxies for corporate elections, if in the public interest or for
the protection of investors. In 1942, the SEC adopted Rule 14a-8, which,
with certain exceptions, permits a shareholder to place a proposal on the
proxy ballot that corporate management sends to its shareholders to solicit
their votes. 93 Thus, a shareholder who has a proposal that is a proper subject
for a shareholder vote can avoid the costly process of printing and
distributing the shareholder’s own proxy materials.
One of the exceptions in Rule 14a-8 is a shareholder proposal that
“relates to an election” for directors. 94 The exception limits access to the
proxy with respect to the most significant right that shareholders in a
publicly traded company possess: the right to elect the directors. 95
Nevertheless, almost universally, the proxy that management sends to
shareholders contains a single slate of directors, and shareholders only have
the choice of either voting for management’s slate or withholding their
votes from one or more of the proposed directors. Rule 14a-8 does not
87. Lehman
Brothers
Holdings,
Inc.,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/
business/companies/lehman_brothers_holdings_inc/index.html (last visited May 19, 2009).
88. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., supra note 87.
89. SEC Press Release 2008-218 (Sept. 21, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-218.htm.
90. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 77, at 529–30.
91. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 13).
92. 15 U.S.C. §78n(a).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2008).
95. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 111
(2d ed. 2004). Under state law, shareholders have no right to manage the business of a
corporation. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW §141; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §701; Helfman v. American
Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540, 550 (N.J. Ch. 1936) (“In a purely business corporation . . . the
authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation must be regarded as
absolute when they act within the law.”). Typically, state law requires shareholders to approve
major corporate changes, such as mergers and reorganizations.
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enable a shareholder to propose a non-management candidate, or slate of
candidates, unless the shareholder is willing and able to launch an
expensive proxy fight. The typical single-slate election is inconsistent with
the “fair corporate suffrage” 96 purpose of Section 14(a).
Although unrestricted shareholder access to the management proxy for
the election of directors poses practical problems, with the growth of
ownership of corporate shares by institutional investors, it may be feasible
to allow limited access. In fact, in 2003, the SEC proposed a rule that would
have allowed a shareholder or group of shareholders holding more than five
percent of the voting shares to place a nominee on the management’s ballot,
but only if the company had been unresponsive to shareholder concerns. 97
Faced with fierce opposition from corporate management, the SEC shelved
this relatively mild proposal.
In 2006, an important issue arose concerning the definition of the
exception for the election of directors. In American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees v. American International Group, Inc.
(AIG), the Second Circuit held that a shareholder proposal, not to submit a
candidate’s name to be voted on for director but simply to amend a
company’s bylaws to establish a procedure by which shareholdernominated candidates may be included on management’s ballot, did not
“relate to an election” and therefore had to be included in management’s
proxy. 98 The court based its decision largely on the inconsistency of
previous SEC staff “No Action” letters concerning the exact meaning of the
exception. 99

96. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
97. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48626, Investment

Company Act Release No. 26206, 81 SEC Docket 770 (Oct. 14, 2003).
98. Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d
Cir. 2006).
99. A no action letter is a statement by the staff that it will not take enforcement action if a
person engages in certain enumerated acts. Although the staff insists that no action letters are not
interpretations of the law, they are universally regarded as such. In the area of shareholder
proposals, no action letters allow a company to exclude a given shareholder proposal from its
proxy materials.
This was not the first time that a court refused to defer to the views of the SEC on the
ground that the SEC previously took a contrary position. In Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the Supreme Court refused to accept the SEC’s position as an
amicus that a non-contributory pension plan was a security, pointing out that “[u]ntil the instant
litigation arose, the public record reveals no evidence that the SEC had ever considered the
Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pension plans.” See Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters, at 566. In Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals voided an SEC rule that required a hedge fund manager to register under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 if the hedge fund had more than 14 investors. The Act
requires an adviser to register if it has more than 14 “clients.” The court noted that the SEC had
previously taken the position that “when ‘an adviser to an investment pool manages the assets of
the pool on the basis of the investment objectives of the participants as group, . . . the pool—rather
than each participant’ is a ‘client.’” See Goldstein, at 880.
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In October 2007, the SEC, by a 3–1 vote, 100 broadened the exception to
the shareholder proposal rule, thus overruling AIG. It amended the rule so
as to provide that a shareholder proposal may be excluded if it “relates to a
nomination or an election for membership on the company’s board of
directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination
or election.” 101 Although the Commission claimed that the amendment was
merely intended to clarify the “election of directors” exclusion, its effect
has been a substantial diminution of shareholder rights.
As a result of the rule change, shareholders have neither the right to
place their nominees on management’s ballot, nor the right to alter the
voting system to give themselves greater access to the proxy process.
Coming down firmly in favor of management and against public
shareholders, the SEC stated that management may exclude shareholder
proposals “requiring companies to include shareholder nominees for
director . . . or otherwise resulting in a solicitation on behalf of shareholder
nominees in opposition to management-chosen nominees.” 102
D. OPPOSITION TO PRIVATE LAWSUITS
The SEC has repeatedly urged the Supreme Court to reduce the rights
of investors in private lawsuits seeking recovery for securities fraud. In
amicus curiae briefs, the SEC has used its influence to persuade the Court
to require mandatory arbitration of customer-broker disputes, to give
investment bankers immunity from antitrust liability, to tighten pleading
requirements in securities fraud cases, and to dismiss investors’ claims on
the ground of failure to prove causation. Furthermore, in one landmark
case, 103 several former SEC commissioners, some of whom represented
companies with an actual or potential interest in the litigation, filed an
amicus brief opposed to the interests of investors.
SEC amicus curiae briefs have been influential in shaping the views of
the Court on the complex issues it often faces in securities cases. In earlier
years, the SEC used these briefs to support plaintiff investors, arguing that
enforcement of the securities laws by investors is “a necessary supplement
to Commission action.” 104 In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 105 a 1985 securities fraud case involving the false “tipping” of nonexistent inside information, the Court expressly referred to the SEC’s
100. The vote was along party lines, the Republicans on the Commission voting in favor of the
rule and the Democrats voting against. One Democratic seat was vacant at the time. Bryn R.
Vaaler, SEC Permits Exclusion of Shareholder-Access Proposals, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP,
Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://www.dorsey.com/corporate_update_nov28_2007/.
101. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No.
56914, SEC Docket 256 (Dec. 6, 2007).
102. Id.
103. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008).
104. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
105. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
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amicus brief supporting the plaintiff, stating: “The SEC has advised us that
it ‘does not have the resources to police the industry sufficiently to ensure
that false tipping does not occur or is consistently discovered’ . . . . Thus it
is particularly important to permit ‘litigation among guilty parties.’” 106 The
SEC itself echoed this view in 1994 when it filed an amicus brief for the
plaintiff with the Court in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver: “Private actions under Rule 10b-5 are an essential supplement to
Commission enforcement of the Exchange Act, and the Commission has a
strong interest in seeing that the principles applied in such actions promote
the purposes of the securities laws.” 107
Nevertheless, in recent years the Commission filed several amicus
briefs in private securities suits urging the Court to interpret the securities
laws narrowly and in contravention of investors’ interests. In
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the issue before the Court
was whether an agreement between a customer and a brokerage firm to
arbitrate any future dispute that might arise under the Exchange Act was
enforceable. 108 The SEC’s amicus brief argued that the section of the
Exchange Act that voids a waiver of compliance with any provision of the
Exchange Act or SEC rules did not apply to a waiver of the right to have a
dispute tried in a federal court, but only to substantive rights. 109 The
securities industry wanted mandatory arbitration of disputes with its
customers because: (1) arbitration tends to be less expensive than litigation
and (2) it believed that a panel selected in an industry-sponsored arbitration
would be less likely than a federal jury to favor the investor. Mandatory
arbitration could not have benefited investors, because the rules of the
NYSE and NASD already required their members to arbitrate any customer
dispute if the customer so desired. The Supreme Court held, by a 5–4 vote,
that the arbitration agreement, which was on a standard printed form given
to the customer to sign on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, was enforceable. 110
The SEC’s brief may well have had a strong, if not decisive, influence on
the Court’s decision.
106. Id. at 315–16.
107. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of

Respondents at 2, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S 164 (1994)
(No. 92-854) (the Court disagreed with the SEC and held for the defendant).
108. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1987).
109. The anti-waiver provision is §29(a) of the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 29(a) (2006). In
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Supreme Court had held that an agreement to arbitrate a
dispute arising under the 1933 Act was unenforceable, citing the anti-waiver provision of that Act
and concluding that the investor-protection purposes of the securities laws trumped the purpose of
the Federal Arbitration Act, which was to enforce agreements to arbitrate to the same extent as
other contracts. Since McMahon involved the anti-waiver clause of the Exchange Act, not the
Securities Act, it did not overrule Wilko, but two years later the Court formally overruled Wilko in
Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
110. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). The arbitration
clause was in a standard-form contract. See id., Exhibit to the Record at 2541, 1853.
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The SEC’s anti-investor stance in McMahon was unusual at the time,
but during recent years the Commission has consistently filed, or
participated in filing, amicus briefs with the Supreme Court on behalf of
defendants in securities cases.
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 111 the question before the
Court was what was necessary in order for a plaintiff to plead the requisite
element of “loss causation” (i.e., that the defendant’s securities fraud caused
the harm to the plaintiff) in a Rule 10b-5 suit. The suit was a class action, in
which plaintiffs claimed that misrepresentations by the defendant
corporation had led them to buy shares in the corporation. The Court, at the
urging of the SEC, interpreted the loss causation requirement strictly. It
held that a misrepresentation claim must be dismissed if it fails to allege
that the defendant’s misrepresentations caused a disparity between the
market price and the value of the stock at the time the plaintiffs bought the
stock, even though the plaintiffs later sold the stock for a loss at a lower
price. 112 Yet, before a trial of the issues, it may be impossible for a plaintiff
to allege sufficient facts to plead loss causation. The Dura decision has
greatly increased the difficulty for plaintiffs in securities fraud suits to get
past the pleading stage and have their cases heard by a jury. 113
In Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 114 the Court, reversing the
Seventh Circuit, strictly interpreted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA) provision that required a plaintiff in a securities fraud
suit to plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of”
the defendant’s scienter (scienter, i.e. intentional or reckless conduct, is a
requisite element of a Rule 10b-5 claim). 115 The Court held that, in order to
decide whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to meet this requirement,
the trial court must weigh all reasonable competing inferences, including
those potentially negative to the plaintiff. 116 Thus, the judge, before trial,
must assume the role that a jury would normally perform, and dismiss the
case if inferences negative to the plaintiff outweigh those that are positive
to him. The government’s brief, which was signed by members of the
SEC’s Office of General Counsel, supported this anti-investor interpretation
of the PSLRA. 117 Like the Dura decision, Tellabs restricts the ability of
plaintiffs in securities fraud suits to get beyond the pleading stage and have
their cases tried by a jury.

111. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Michael Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2007); Lentell v. Merrill

Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005).
114. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
116. Tellabs, Inc., at 308.
117. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (No. 06-484).
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In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 118 the issue was
whether investment banking firms that engage in anti-competitive practices
in connection with initial public offerings (IPOs) of securities enjoy an
implied immunity from liability under the antitrust laws. In earlier cases,
the Supreme Court had been reluctant to imply immunity from antitrust
liability on the ground that the actions complained of were governed by
another federal regulatory scheme. The Court had held that such immunity
exists only where anticompetitive actions in the securities area are
necessary to make the Exchange Act work, and even then only to the extent
necessary. 119 In Billing, the practices complained of in the antitrust suit
were alleged misconduct in IPOs that the SEC either had previously
condemned or, in all likelihood, would not approve in the future. 120 In
response to a request by the Court, the SEC’s General Counsel gave an
opinion that there was implied immunity from the antitrust laws. 121 The
Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit, agreed with the SEC on the
grounds that the case involved “(1) an area of conduct squarely within the
heartland of securities regulations; (2) clear and adequate SEC authority to
regulate; (3) active and ongoing agency regulation; and (4) a serious
conflict between the antitrust and regulatory regimes.” 122 The Billing
decision broadened the scope of antitrust immunity beyond that established
in previous Supreme Court cases and further limited investors’ ability to
recover for harm done to them by brokerage firms.
The Supreme Court decision of recent years that, from a practical
viewpoint, probably most restricted the ability of investors to recover
damages from securities fraud was Stoneridge Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc. 123 In 1994, the Supreme Court held in Central Bank of Denver,
v. First Bank of Denver, that a private plaintiff could not maintain a suit
against a person for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5, but could
only sue primary violators of the rule. 124 The question raised in Stoneridge
was whether persons who knowingly participated in a fraudulent scheme,
but made no acts or statements that the plaintiff relied on, could be regarded
as primary violators (and therefore subject to possible liability under Rule
10b-5) or only as aiders and abettors. The case was of the utmost
importance because the decision was likely to affect the liability of the only
persons from whom victims of massive corporate frauds such as Enron and
WorldCom might recover their losses: secondary actors such as
accountants, attorneys, and investment bankers.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Glen Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383 (2007).
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
These practices are described below in text accompanying notes 148–51.
Letter Brief, at 7, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007) (Nos. 039284 and 03-9288).
122. Credit Suisse Securities, 127 S.Ct. at 2397.
123. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008).
124. Central Bank of Denver v. First Bank of Denver, 511 U.S 164, 191 (1994).
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The SEC did not file an amicus brief in Stoneridge, but a group of
sixteen former SEC chairmen, commissioners, and general counsels, as well
as eleven law professors, did file a brief arguing that secondary actors could
not be primary violators of Rule 10b-5 unless they themselves made false
statements on which the plaintiffs relied. 125 In particular, the brief urged the
Court to reject the plaintiffs’ theory of “scheme liability”: that a secondary
actor who knowingly participates in a fraudulent scheme may be liable
under Rule 10b-5 even if that person does not himself make a false public
statement. 126 The brief went further, arguing that to adopt the scheme
liability theory would expand the right of action under Rule 10b-5, and that
“[t]he days of judicially-implied private rights of action are long past.” 127
The Court, affirming a decision of the Eighth Circuit by a 5–3 vote, adopted
much of the reasoning in the amicus brief and held in favor of the
defendants.
The filing of this strongly anti-investor brief by a large group of former
SEC chairmen and commissioners is a matter of some concern. For one
thing, it indicates the extent to which laissez-faire “law and economics”
theory has influenced academics and even regulators. Even so, it is
surprising that a large number of former members and senior officials of the
SEC should go out of their way to obtain a narrow interpretation of the
Exchange Act that would defeat or hinder investors’ chances of recovery of
losses due to securities fraud.
It is possible that the signers of the brief were deluded by antiregulatory theory, but it is also possible that at least some of the signers
were serving their own financial interests. What is most disturbing is that
their brief did not disclose any of their existing affiliations or clients; they
identified themselves only by their former positions at the SEC, which was
125. The former SEC chairmen who signed the brief were Roderick M. Hills, Harvey L. Pitt
(who had previously been General Counsel), and Harold M. Williams. The former commissioners
were Charles C. Cox, Edward H. Fleischman, Stephen J. Friedman, Joseph A. Grundfest, Isaac C.
Hunt, Jr., Roberta S. Karmel, Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Richard Y. Roberts, Laura S. Unger, and
Steven Wallman. The former general counsels (in addition to Pitt) were James Doty and Simon
M. Lorne. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 2–3, 24, Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43).
Former chairmen William H. Donaldson and Arthur Levitt and former commissioner Harvey
Goldschmid (who had previously served as General Counsel) filed an amicus brief on behalf of
the plaintiff. See id.
126. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law and Finance Professors as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 15–16, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43).
127. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
24, Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2007) (No. 06-43). The
question of whether there was an implied right of action for a violation Rule 10b-5 was not even
before the Court, which had acknowledged that such a right existed on several previous occasions.
See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“[A] private right of
action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recognized for
more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.”). See
also Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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the only reason their views would have had any significance to the Court.
Several signers were partners in Washington law firms or consulting firms
that represented publicly-held corporations, banks and broker-dealers—
entities that may well have had a potential financial interest in the outcome
of the case. 128 One of the signers was a partner in a law firm that advertised
itself as a Washington lobbyist for corporate clients. 129
The “revolving door” practice, under which SEC staff members may be
tempted to “go easy” on enforcing securities laws because they have the
prospect of high-paying Wall Street jobs, has been widely commented on
(and will be discussed below), particularly in connection with the recent
SEC enforcement failures. 130 However, the potential evils of the revolving
door also implicate members of the Commission. For a substantial number
of these persons to use their prestige, acquired at least in part from their
former positions as members (or general counsels) of the SEC, to urge the
Supreme Court to interpret the securities laws in favor of their clients (and
not in favor of investors), without any disclosure of their affiliations or the
identity of their clients, is a measure of the distance that the SEC has
traveled from its original mission of investor protection. It does not seem
rash to predict that present members of the Commission will, after they
reenter private life, similarly use their former positions to serve their
corporate clients to the detriment of public investors.
III. ENFORCEMENT FAILURES
The Bernard Madoff scandal that came to light in December 2008 was
only the latest of the SEC’s enforcement failures during the past decade.
Unlike Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, which apparently was a single huge fraud,
many of the other situations involved abuses that were widespread in the
securities industry. Since 2000, the SEC has failed to take timely and
effective action to prevent abuses in connection with IPOs, tainted
investment advice by research analysts at investment banking firms, late
trading and market timing of mutual funds, and fraudulent sales of auction

128. Edward H. Fleischman, a former commissioner, was counsel to Linklaters LP, a law firm
that represents banks and investment companies, and specializes in advice to the world’s leading
companies; Harvey L. Pitt, a former chairman, was the CEO of Kalorama Partners, LLC, a
consultant to corporations; Steven Wallman, a former commisisoner, was founder of FOLIOfn, a
brokerage and investment company; Roderick M. Hills, a former chairman, was a founder and
partner of Hills, Stern & Morley, a law firm that represents international finance corporations;
James Doty, a former general counsel, was a partner in Baker Botts, a law firm that represents
corporations and broker-dealers; Simon M. Lorne, a former general counsel, was vice chairman
and chief legal officer of Millenium Management LLC, a hedge fund.
129. Richard Y. Roberts, a former commissioner, was a partner in Roberts, Raheb & Gradler, a
law firm that advertises itself as a lobbyist for corporate clientele.
130. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Madoff Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A45.
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rate securities. Investors have lost billions of dollars as a result of the SEC’s
inability or unwillingness to fulfill its enforcement responsibilities. 131
Ironically, in its own enforcement activities, the SEC has not met the
standard of conduct that it requires of the broker-dealer firms it regulates. 132
On numerous occasions, the SEC has failed to detect abuses or has failed to
take appropriate action despite the appearance of “red flags,” where similar
conduct by a broker-dealer firm would have invited SEC disciplinary
action. When imposing sanctions on brokerage firms for inadequate
supervision, the SEC has stated:
We have repeatedly held that brokers and dealers are under a duty to
supervise the actions of employees and that in large organizations it is
especially imperative that the system of internal control be adequate and
effective and that those in authority exercise the utmost vigilance
whenever even a remote indication of irregularity reaches their
attention. 133
There must be adequate follow-up and review when a firm’s own
procedures detect irregularities or unusual trading activity . . . . 134

It appears that, far from monitoring the securities markets and securities
industry in order to detect and terminate abusive and illegal practices, the
SEC was prompted into action only after investigative financial reporters or
state regulators had unearthed them. Congressional and internal
investigations of SEC enforcement policies and procedures, prompted in
part by the sensational Madoff case, may determine whether the
Commission’s failure to enforce the securities law was a result of policy or
ineffectiveness, or a combination of the two. In either case, the sheer
number and size of its failures point to a systemic problem at the agency.
A. ABUSES IN IPOS
In 2000, several industry-wide abuses by investment banking firms in
the allocation of new issues of securities were exposed, largely through the
work of investigative reporters at the Wall Street Journal (Journal). In the
“hot issue” market of the late 1990s, obtaining an allocation of a new issue
131. This partial listing of SEC enforcement failures does not include its failure to prevent
widespread violations of law for protracted periods in the nation’s two principal stock markets. At
the NYSE, between 1999 and 2006, all seven specialist firms denied investors the best prices by
needlessly interpositioning themselves between public orders for their own profit. In the Nasdaq
over-the-counter market, traders routinely rigged prices for several years during the 1990s. POSER
& FANTO, supra note 45, at §4.01[D], 9–11.
132. Exch. Act §15(b)(4)(E) gives the SEC authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on
broker-dealers that fail to exercise reasonable supervision over their personnel.
133. Reynolds & Co., Exchange Release No. 6273, 39 SEC 902, 917, 1960 WL 56264 (May
25, 1960) (emphasis added). See also John H. Gutfreund, Exch. Act Release No. 31554, 1992 WL
362753 (Dec. 3, 1992).
134. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Exch. Act Release No. 21813, 1985 WL 548567, at
*7 (Mar. 5, 1985).
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was extremely valuable. It was not uncommon for the price of a newly
issued stock to rise by more than fifty percent during the first day of
trading. In January 2000, the Journal reported that several Wall Street firms
kept secret lists of institutional investors to whom the firms awarded new
issue allocations in return for their brokerage business. 135 Thus, even
though an offering was ostensibly made to the public, a large proportion of
the shares went to favored customers in return for a valuable consideration.
Later that year and in 2001, the Journal published additional
information about widespread abuses in the allocation process. They
included: (1) “spinning,” i.e., allocating IPO stocks to the personal accounts
of executives of companies in return for the companies’ investment banking
business; 136 (2) “laddering,” i.e., allocating IPO shares of a company on
condition that the client buys additional shares of the company’s stock in
the aftermarket; 137 and (3) allocating IPO shares on condition that the client
pay especially high commissions on unrelated brokerage transactions. 138
According to the SEC staff, laddering was an illegal manipulative device. 139
Spinning and charging excessive commissions may also have amounted to
illegal kickbacks. 140 The effect of these practices was not only to
manipulate the after-market prices of new issues but also to exclude the
ordinary individual investor, who had nothing to offer the underwriter
except ordinary commissions on his or her transactions, from allocations of
public offerings of securities.
In late 2000, the Journal reported that, according to a former SEC
commissioner, the agency had discussed various questionable practices in
the allocation of IPOs in the early 1990s, but it was not until 1997 that SEC
135. Randall Smith & Suzanne McGee, Major Institutions, Led by Fidelity, Get Most of Hot
IPOs, Lists Show, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2000 at C1.
136. Terzah Ewing, NASD Would Bar Some Big Investors From All IPOs, Not Just the Hot
Ones, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18 2000, at B2; Charles Gasparino et al., SEC Targets IPO Process With
Probes — Latest Case Poses Challenge for Agency, But Solutions Exist, WALL ST. J., Dec 19,
2000 at C1.
137. Susan Pulliam et al., Coming to Terms: CSFB Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Settle Twin
IPO Investigations — Probes by SEC and NASD Grew Out of Conduct During Dot-Com Frenzy
— A Legacy of Wheat’s Reign, WALL ST. J., Dec 11, 2001, at A1; Cassell Bryan-Low, Deals &
Deal Makers: Latest IPO Boom: Number of Suits Alleging Abuses by Underwriters, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 2001, at C12; Susan Pulliam & Randall Smith, SEC’s IPO Inquiries Advance on Two
Fronts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2001, at C1.
138. Gasparino et al., supra note 136, at C1; Kathryn Kranhold, Deals & Deal Makers: SEC
Intensifies Inquiry Into Commissions for Hot IPOs — Are Hefty Payments Business as Usual —
Or Illegal Activity, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2000, at C1; Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, U.S.
Probes Inflated Commissions for Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2000, at C1.
139. In August 2000, the SEC staff opined that laddering (a device designed to ensure a
continued rise in the price of the stock) was a violation of the SEC’s anti-manipulative rules. SEC
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 10 (Aug. 25, 2000).
140. These practices were the basis for the investors’ claims in the Billing antitrust case,
discussed above. They were also the subject of over 1,000 securities class actions brought by
investors, which were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. See In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 294 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2002).
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enforcement officers began investigating possible spinning. 141 “After the
Journal’s ‘spinning’ disclosures, . . . the SEC’s enforcement division . . .
launched full-blown investigations into the matter.” 142 Thus, throughout the
1990s, major investment banking firms were engaged in abusive practices
without any intervention by the SEC, although the SEC had received
warnings of those practices years earlier.
B. RESEARCH ANALYSTS
On April 8, 2002, New York Attorney General (NYAG) Eliot Spitzer
announced the results of an investigation of conflicts of interest of research
analysts at Merrill. 143 The investigation showed that, from 1999 to 2001,
Merrill did not publish a single “reduce” or “sell” recommendation on any
stock in its Internet group. Furthermore, internal Merrill emails by analysts
referred to some stocks that the firm was recommending to its customers as
a “piece of junk,” a “piece of crap,” or in even more disparaging
language. 144 The NYAG discovered that, unknown to the general public,
Merrill’s research analysts were not giving impartial investment advice to
their customers, rather, the advice was tailored to attract and keep the
investment banking business of corporate clients.
Two weeks after the NYAG’s announcement, the SEC announced that
it was making an inquiry into the practices of research analysts at Merrill. 145
Eventually, it became clear that the conflicts of interest of Merrill’s analysts
were far from unique; the problem pervaded the securities industry. In April
2003, the SEC, NYSE, NASD, NYAG, and several other state securities
regulators announced the details of a “global settlement” with ten of the
largest investment banking firms and two individual analysts. 146 The
settlement with the firms included monetary relief of $1.4 billion, including
civil penalties and disgorgement of profits, as well as various procedural
reforms. 147
It does not appear that the SEC took any action in the research analyst
scandal until the NYAG’s sensational announcement prompted it to act. 148
For at least two years, the largest broker-dealer firms made a practice of
betraying their customers by publishing tainted research reports, apparently
without the SEC noticing.
141. Gasparino et al., supra note 136, at C1.
142. Id.
143. POSER & FANTO, supra note 45, §22.04[B], at 26–29, §22.04[C], at 30–34, §22.04[D], at

34–38, §22.04[E], at 38–40, §22.04[F], at 40.
144. Id. at §22.04[B], at 22–27, §22.04[C].
145. SEC Launches Inquiry into Research Analyst Conflicts, Release No. 2002-56 (Apr. 25,
2002).
146. POSER & FANTO, supra note 45, at §22.04[C], at 30–34.
147. Id. at §22.04[C], at 22–30.
148. Id. at §22.04[B], at 26–29, §22.04[C], at 30–34, §22.04[D], at 34–38, §22.04[E], at 38–40,
§22.04[F], at 40.
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C. LATE TRADING AND MARKET TIMING
In September 2003, NYAG Spitzer announced that his office had
obtained evidence of “widespread illegal trading schemes that potentially
cost mutual fund shareholders billions of dollars.” 149 These schemes
consisted of “late trading” and “market timing” of mutual funds. 150 The
NYAG simultaneously announced that it had reached a $40 million
settlement with a hedge fund and its managing principal on charges
involving these abuses. 151
Late trading is a violation of SEC Rule 22c-1 under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, which requires “forward pricing” of mutual fund
shares. 152 Forward pricing means that the purchaser (or seller) of a mutual
fund pays (or receives) a price that is based on the net asset value of the
fund at the close of the market (4:00 p.m. Eastern Time) following the
purchase. 153 Late trading involves the purchase or sale of fund shares after
the market closes, at a price that has already been set, allowing the trader to
take advantage of post-closing events that are not reflected in the net asset
value of the fund. 154 According to the NYAG, “[a]llowing late trading is
like allowing betting on a horse race after the horses have crossed the finish
line.” 155
Market timing involves short-term trading of mutual fund shares.
Additionally, in the case of funds that invest in foreign shares, it may be
used to take advantage of time-zone differences. The practice is not illegal;
in fact, the SEC staff had earlier been opposed to restricting short-term
trading in mutual funds because the restriction would have limited
investors’ right to redeem their shares; as a result, in 2000, the SEC did not
take a position when some market timers sued fund companies for trying to
restrict their trading. 156 Nonetheless, a mutual fund prospectus that states
that the fund does not permit short-term trading may be misleading if the
fund company does permit certain traders to trade short-term. Furthermore,
a broker-dealer or investor who falsifies his or her identity to engage in
trading not permitted by the fund company may be committing fraud. 157

149. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Attorney General Spitzer and Securities and
Exchange Commission File Charges Against Bank of America Broker (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter
Sept. 2003 Press Release, Attorney General Spitzer].
150. Id.
151. Id. The announcement of the settlement stated that the hedge fund and its managers agreed
to make restitution of $30 million in illegal profits and pay a $10 million penalty.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2009).
153. Id.
154. Marcia Vickers, How Eliot Spitzer Makes the SEC Look Stodgy, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_37/b3849047.htm.
155. Sept. 2003 Press Release, Attorney General Spitzer, supra note 149.
156. This information was given to the author by David Silver, a former president of the
Investment Company Institute, the trade association of the mutual fund industry.
157. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F.Supp.2d 845 (D. Md. 2005).
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Subsequent investigations by the NYAG and the SEC revealed that
several hedge funds and other investors, assisted by brokerage firms and, in
some cases, by mutual fund companies, had engaged in late trading and
market timing for years. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the SEC made
regular examinations of mutual fund companies during the period in
question, it never brought an enforcement action against any broker-dealer,
mutual fund company, hedge fund, or any other investor based on either of
these practices before the NYAG’s announcement in September 2003.
D. AUCTION RATE SECURITIES (ARS)
ARS are long-term bonds or preferred stock whose interest rates or
dividends are reset by auctions that typically occur at intervals of between
seven and thirty-five days. These auctions provide the primary source of
liquidity for investors who wish to sell their investments. Investors who
buy ARS typically seek a cash-like investment that pays a higher yield than
a money market fund or certificate of deposit. 158
During recent years, billions of dollars of ARS were sold to investors
by major brokerage houses as cash alternatives. In February 2008, the ARS
market collapsed, with the result that investors were left holding illiquid
In June 2008, William F. Galvin, Secretary of the
securities. 159
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, brought a civil action against UBS
Securities, LLC and UBS Financial Services, Inc. (together, UBS), charging
that UBS had sold ARS to customers with false representations that they
were liquid, safe, money-market instruments that could be sold at the next
auction, whereas “no true auction existed for many of these securities.” 160 A
month later, NYAG Andrew Cuomo announced his own lawsuit against
UBS, charging that “UBS customers are holding more than $25 billion in
illiquid, long-term paper as a result of UBS’s fraudulent misrepresentations
and illegal conduct.” 161 On July 31, the Massachusetts regulator, Secretary
of the Commonwealth William Galvin, brought a similar action against
Merrill; 162 and on August 7, the NYAG announced a settlement with
Citigroup under which the company would fully reimburse 40,000
customers who had been unable to sell their ARS since February 12, 2008,
and pay civil penalties of $50 million each to the NYAG and the North
158. FINRA Investor Alert, Auction Rate Securities: What Happens When Auctions Fail,
http://www.finra.org/investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/Bonds/PO38207 (last visited Feb.
4, 2009).
159. Id.
160. Administrative Complaint, In the Matter of UBS Securities, LLC & UBS Financial
Services, Inc., Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Mass., No. 2008-0058 (June 26,
2008).
161. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney General, Attorney General Cuomo brings National MultiBillion Dollar Lawsuit Against UBS for Auction Rate Securities Scandal (July 24, 2008).
162. Administrative Complaint, In the Matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Mass., No. 2008-0058 (July 31, 2008).

2009]

Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation

315

American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA). 163 On August
11, the NYAG announced that it was expanding its investigation to
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wachovia. 164
Until August 7, 2008, the SEC took no public action with respect to the
ARS mess. However, on that day, the SEC enforcement chief announced a
preliminary settlement with Citigroup compatible with the agreements
already reached with the NYAG and NASAA. 165 It is disturbing enough
that:
where hundreds of thousands of ordinary investors were stuffed with
impossible-to-sell bonds they thought were the equivalent of cash – it has
been Andrew Cuomo, the combative attorney-general of New York State,
who has wrung restitution out of brokers thanks to his legal threats, rather
than the SEC. 166

It is at least equally disturbing that, before the ARS market collapsed in
February 2008, several of the largest brokerage firms were selling many
billions of dollars of securities to their customers throughout the country by
means of misrepresentations as to the nature of these securities, while the
SEC was either unaware of this practice or, if it was aware, took no action
to stop it.
E. THE MADOFF SCANDAL
On December 11, 2008, the SEC charged Bernard Madoff and his
investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, with
perpetrating a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme on advisory clients of the
firm. 167 In view of the fact that the SEC had apparently not detected four
previous industry-wide multi-billion dollar frauds during the past eight
years until the frauds were pointed out to it by state regulators or the
financial press, it does not seem surprising that the Commission missed this
one. In the Madoff case, the SEC ignored repeated warnings and filed a
complaint in federal court only after Madoff’s own sons turned him in and
he voluntarily admitted to the SEC staff that his investment advisory
business was “all just one big lie . . . basically a giant Ponzi scheme.” 168

163. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces Landmark
Settlement with Citigroup to Recover Billions in Auction Rate Securities for Investors Nationwide
(Aug. 7, 2008).
164. Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Expands Investigation into
Auction Rate Securities Scandal (Aug. 11, 2008).
165. Speech by SEC Staff: Statement at News Conference Announcing Citigroup Preliminary
Settlement (Aug. 7, 2008).
166. Stephen Foley, How Wall Street’s Watchdog May Be Muzzled, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Aug. 15, 2008.
167. Press Release, SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme,
Release No. 2008-293 (Dec. 11, 2008).
168. Id.
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According to the SEC, Madoff estimated that the losses from his fraud were
at least $50 billion. 169
What was surprising was SEC Chairman Christopher Cox’s reaction to
the Commission’s failure. He publicly attacked the SEC staff. A former
SEC Special Counsel described the attack as “throwing the agency’s
enforcement staff ‘under the bus’ to deflect blame for his own leadership
failures.” 170 Five days after announcing the charges against Madoff,
Chairman Cox issued a press release:
Our initial findings have been deeply troubling. The Commission has
learned that credible and specific allegations regarding Mr. Madoff’s
financial wrongdoing, going back to at least 1999, were repeatedly
brought to the attention of SEC staff, but were never recommended to the
Commission for action. I am gravely concerned by the apparent multiple
failures over at least a decade to thoroughly investigate these allegations
or at any point to seek formal authority to pursue them. 171

Nowhere in the press release was there any suggestion that the
Commission itself might have been at fault or that the Chairman and the
four other Commissioners bore some responsibility for what had gone
wrong. Again, it may be helpful to analogize the Commission’s
responsibility to supervise its staff to the obligation that the SEC places on
the senior management of brokerage firms. According to the SEC in one
enforcement action: “[R]esponsibility for the supervisory function of a
registered broker-dealer is incumbent upon the most senior members of
management. Senior management has a duty not only to provide a
meaningful supervisory structure, but also to actively monitor and enforce
it.” 172 In another such case, the SEC stated: “Establishment of policies and
169. Id. See also Joanna Chung, Prosecutor Reveals $1m Details of Madoff’s Jewellery Mailing
List, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at 1 (“Mr. Madoff’s sons alerted prosecutors last week that they
had received jewellery in the mail from their father. Mr. Madoff’s alleged fraud came to light last
month when they turned him in.”).
170. Joanna Chung & Greg Farrell, SEC Under Pressure on Failed Detection, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
18, 2008, at 16.
171. Press Release, SEC, Statement Regarding Madoff Investigation 2008-297 (Dec. 16, 2008).
According to one report in the financial press, the SEC’s investigatory interest in Madoff goes
back to at least 1992, as the result of a confidential tip that three small firms raising money
exclusively for Madoff were promising annual returns of up to 20 percent. The SEC shut down
the firms for selling unregistered shares, but the investigation raised no red flags as to Madoff’s
operations. Peter Burrows, How Madoff is Burning the SEC, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 2009,
(Magazine), at 24, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_02/
b4115024163467.htm?chan=magazine+channel_news. In January 2009, the SEC’s inspector
general told a congressional committee that his office had begun an investigation into the
agency’s failure to uncover the alleged Ponzi scheme. Alex Berenson, Bid to Revoke Madoff’s
Bail
Cites
His
Gifts,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
6,
2009,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/business/06madoff.html?_r=1&partner=MOREOVERNEW
S&ei=5040.
172. Signal Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 43350, 2000 WL 1423891, at *8 (Sept. 26,
2000). Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E) expressly imposes on broker-dealer firms a duty to supervise,

2009]

Why the SEC Failed: Regulators Against Regulation

317

procedures alone is not sufficient to discharge supervisory responsibility. It
is also necessary to implement measures to monitor compliance with those
policies and procedures.” 173
Furthermore, the SEC has emphasized the importance of a brokerdealer firm making internal audits of its branch offices and then acting on
any potential or actual problems identified in the audit reports. 174 The fact
that the SEC’s enforcement staff had failed to uncover several massive
frauds in the recent past should have made it clear to the Commission that it
needed a supervisory program to monitor its examiners and investigators to
make sure they were doing their job, including to determine whether the
Commission was alerted to red flags indicating possible misconduct. 175 If
the SEC had itself followed the precepts that it laid down for brokerdealers, it might have detected the Madoff fraud many years earlier and
saved investors billions of dollars of losses.
IV. WHY THE SEC FAILED
A. REGULATORS AGAINST REGULATION
The financial debacle of 2008 and the Madoff scandal have generated
criticism of the SEC’s performance and several explanations for the
agency’s failures. The explanations include conflicts of interest of the staff,
lack of staff training, budgetary restraints, and the fragmented nature of the
regulatory system. The fundamental reason for the failures, however, is the
anti-regulatory climate, supported by academically generated antiregulatory theory, that has pervaded government (including the SEC) in the
past two or three decades. The SEC’s main focus has changed from
protecting investors to protecting the companies and investment firms that
the SEC is required to regulate. As two knowledgeable observers recently
wrote: “Created to protect investors from financial predators, the

and §15(b)(6)(A) extends that duty to individuals in the firm who have supervisory
responsibilities.
173. Speer, Leeds & Kellogg, L.P., Exchange Act Release No. 48199, 2003 WL 21688753, at
*7 (July 21, 2003).
174. See ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Broker-Dealer Supervision of
Registered Representative and Branch Office Operations, 44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1369–75 (1989);
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-26766, 1989 WL 257097 (Apr. 28,
1989).
175. In the Madoff case, Harry Markopolous, a former money manager turned fraud
investigator, testified before a congressional committee that the SEC had ignored twenty-nine red
flags pointing to Madoff’s alleged Ponzi scheme that he had brought to the agency’s attention
over a period of nine years. Joanna Chung & Brooke Masters, SEC Staff Ineptitude to Blame in
Madoff Affair, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at 13.
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commission has somehow evolved into a mechanism for protecting
financial predators with political clout from investors.” 176
The shift is evidenced by the anti-investor positions that the SEC (as
well as a number of former commissioners) has taken in the Supreme Court
amicus briefs described above. It can also be seen in public statements
made by several SEC commissioners, which show a fundamental change in
the way the SEC regards the purposes of the securities laws. From the time
that the Exchange Act was enacted until about the late 1970s, it was
generally accepted that curbing fraud and manipulation not only protected
investors but also was good for the health of the economy. As the Supreme
Court stated in 1979, “investor protection was [not] the sole purpose of the
Securities Act. . . . Indeed, Congress’ primary contemplation was that
regulation of the securities markets might help set the economy on the road
to recovery.” 177 In the eyes of Congress, the aim of the Exchange Act was:
to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place
adequate and true information before the investor; to protect honest
enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition
afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked
promotion; to restore the confidence of the prospective investor in his
ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive channels of
industry and development capital which has grown timid to the point of
hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and
consuming power. 178

Thus, in the eyes of Congress and the Supreme Court, effective regulation
of the securities markets would contribute to, not detract from, economic
growth.
This is not the view that has prevailed at the SEC during recent years.
Instead, several commissioners have made it clear that they see regulation
not as part of the essential infrastructure of the economy but rather as a
restraint on it. Their public utterances have sent a not-too-subtle message to
Wall Street and corporate management that the SEC is not inclined to take
its regulatory tasks too seriously. In 2004, SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins
told the Securities Traders Association that “the government’s intrusive
involvement in the markets during the Great Depression” prolonged the
Depression, and “Wall Street became the easy scapegoat for the economic

176. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End of the Financial World As We Know It, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at 9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/opinion/
04lewiseinhorn.html.
177. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (citing S. Rep. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933)).
178. Id.
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deterioration within the United States.” 179 The following year, SEC
Chairman Christopher Cox, speaking to the Economic Club, quoted
approvingly a statement by FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan that “the best
investor protection is a growing economy and a rising market” and added:
“[A]ll that the SEC does – or should be doing for our country – is meant to
help create and sustain an environment that promotes economic growth. . . .
In other words, if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” 180 Thus did Chairman Cox
encapsulate the Commission’s apparent policy of doing nothing until a
massive fraud is brought to its attention by someone else. And in 2006,
Commissioner Atkins told the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform:
“[W]e must not allow the American economy to be encumbered by a web of
excessive regulations that fail the cost/benefit test.” 181 As yet another
example, Commissioner Kathleen Casey has publicly expressed
disagreement with the long-standing court decisions giving defrauded
investors an implied right of action under Rule 10b-5. 182
In speeches to industry groups, SEC commissioners listed capital
formation as one part of a tripartite mission of the agency, the other two
parts being investor protection and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient
markets. 183 If investor protection is just one of three independent goals of
the SEC, it is easy to take the next step and conclude that regulation should
be reduced in order to promote capital formation. That view is inconsistent
with the underlying philosophy of the Exchange Act: that prevention of
fraud, maintaining of fair and orderly markets, and assurance of honest
corporate disclosure are the essential underpinnings of capital formation.
B. STAFF ISSUES
The so-called “revolving door” between employment at the SEC and
the private sector has been cited as a reason why SEC staff members do not
pursue investigations of possible misconduct with greater vigor. The theory
is that staff members see their time at the Commission as a stopping-off
place before accepting a much higher paying job at a Wall Street firm, and
that, because they want to maintain good relations with Wall Street, they
are not diligent as investigators or examiners. 184 The enormous rise in Wall
179. Speech by SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins before the Securities Traders Association
(Oct. 7, 2004), at 1–32.
180. Speech by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox before the Economic Club (Dec. 12, 2005), at
3.
181. Speech by Commissioner Paul S. Atkins before the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform (Feb. 16, 2006), at 1.
182. Speech by SEC Commissioner Kathleen L. Casey before the Institute for Legal Reform’s
Legal Reform Summit (Oct. 24, 2007), at 7 (“I believe it is the role of Congress, not the courts, to
decide whether a private right of action against third parties exists”).
183. See, e.g., id. at 1.
184. See Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 176, at 9 (“If you work for the enforcement division of
the S.E.C. you probably know in the back of your mind, and in the front too, that if you maintain
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Street compensation during the past few years has increased that negative
incentive. 185 This is supported by the Senate report into a failed SEC
investigation of possible insider trading by Pequot Capital Management,
which found:
delays in the investigation, disclosure of sensitive case information by
high-level SEC officials to lawyers for those under scrutiny, a detrimental
narrowing of its scope after a meeting with a Pequot lawyer, and the
appearance of ‘undue deference’ to a prominent Wall Street executive that
resulted in the postponement of his interview until after the case’s statute
of limitations had expired. 186

The findings of the Pequot report suggest the possible exercise of
political influence on senior SEC officials, but do not necessarily point to a
systemic problem of deference to Wall Street by SEC staff members. A
more plausible reason for the high turnover rate is that large salaries in the
private sector have been an almost irresistible lure to young professionals,
particularly those with large student loans. 187 One result is that SEC
investigators and examiners do not stay long enough to be properly trained
and to acquire the experience necessary to understand complex financial
instruments and make discerning judgments as to whether a given
investigative lead should be pursued or dropped. 188
Another problem, related perhaps to the shortage of training and
experience of staff members, is that SEC enforcement officers have an
incentive to rack up a large number of “successes” by bringing easy cases,
which the firm, or individual, is likely to settle and which do not require a
lengthy investigation or an understanding of complex securities.
good relations with Wall Street you might soon be paid huge sums of money to be employed by
it.”).
185. See Krugman, supra note 130, at A45 (“The incomes of the richest Americans have
exploded over the past generation, even as wages have stagnated; high pay on Wall Street was a
major cause of that divergence.”).
186. Gretchen Morgenson & Walt Bogdanich, Report Says S.E.C. Erred on Pequot, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2007 at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/business/
22hedge.html. The report by the Senate Finance and Judiciary committees was prompted by an
accusation that Gary J. Aguirre, a SEC staff member, had been fired in order to prevent him from
pursuing an investigation into the possible insider trading by Pequot and that John J. Mack, a Wall
Street executive and major fund-raiser for President Bush’s 2004 campaign had been given special
treatment by not taking his testimony when Mr. Aguirre wanted to. Walt Bogdanich & Gretchen
Morgenson, S.E.C. Inquiry on Hedge Fund Draws Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006.
187. A former SEC examiner wrote: “The revolving door there is the biggest problem. Many
staff members who are ambitious and competent quit to pursue jobs in the financial industry that
pay multiple times their former government salaries.” Eric W. Bright, Letter to the Editor, It Isn’t
Surprising That SEC Missed Madoff’s Scam, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2008, at A12.
188. According to William J. Brodsky, CEO of the Chicago Board Options Exchange and a
former senior officer of the American Stock Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
financial illiteracy among SEC staff made it easier for Mr. Madoff’s alleged fraud to go
undetected. “The people doing the examinations have no clue what the right questions are to ask,”
Mr. Brodsky told a reporter. Joanna Chung et al., French Madoff Investor Found Dead, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at 1.
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C. BUDGETARY RESTRAINTS
Lack of resources is another frequently cited reason for the SEC’s
failure to detect large frauds. The number of employees in the SEC’s
enforcement division actually decreased between 2005 and 2007—from
1,338 to 1,192; and the number of examiners has not increased since 2002,
even though the number of investment advisors increased by 50 percent
during this period. 189
Whether or not the SEC has sufficient resources is not clear. Between
2000 and 2008, the agency’s budget increased by 140 percent, from $377
million to $906 million; but the number of staff positions increased by only
20 percent, from 3,235 to 3,868. 190 Even if inflation of salaries is taken into
account, the SEC received a very substantial increase in funding during this
period.
Two points are relevant here. First, the SEC collects more in fees each
year than it is appropriated by Congress. In 2008, for example, the agency
collected $1.15 billion in fees, $209 million more than its budget. 191 The
fact that corporations and Wall Street firms, not taxpayers, pay for
securities regulation would argue for increasing the budget, while making
sure that the SEC’s resources are properly used. Arthur Levitt, SEC
Chairman during the Clinton administration, believes that the SEC’s
“leadership must identify the biggest possible risks to investors and to the
entire system and focus resources on these areas.” 192
Second, it is clear that no matter how much money is appropriated, the
SEC will never have enough resources to adequately protect investors
against fraud, manipulation, and inadequate or inaccurate corporate
disclosure. Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized this, stating
that private enforcement of the securities laws “provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action.” 193 Although in recent years the Court,
on the whole, has not been friendly to the implied right of action, it has, on
several occasions, reaffirmed that a private right exists under Rule 10b-5. It
is sound policy, as well as morally right, for the SEC, in its public
utterances and in arguing before the federal courts, to support private
litigants asserting their rights under the securities laws. These suits provide
essential help to the SEC in its enforcement activities.
D. FRAGMENTED REGULATION
Yet another reason often given for the SEC’s ineffectiveness is that,
unlike in most countries, financial regulation in the United States is
189. Chung & Farrell, supra note 170, at 16; Arthur Levitt, Jr., How the SEC Can Prevent
More Madoffs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at A13.
190. SEC ANN. REP. 1, 159 (2000); SEC ANN. REP. 1, 9 (2008).
191. SEC, Fiscal Year 2009 Congressional Justification, at 5 (Feb. 2008).
192. Levitt, Jr., supra note 189, at A13.
193. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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fragmented. Securities transactions are regulated by the SEC; commodities
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); banks by three
federal agencies: the FRB, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; and insurance by state regulators.
There is little rationale for this complex division of regulatory
responsibility, particularly because some kinds of financial instruments do
not fall neatly into one category: for example, variable annuities are both
insurance policies and securities; futures on foreign currencies are regulated
by the CFTC and options on foreign currencies by the SEC, although
traders use both kinds of instruments for similar purposes of hedging and
speculation. 194 Indeed, some financial instruments, such as nonstandardized credit default swaps (which have added greatly to systemic
risk during the credit crisis), are not regulated at all.
The SEC’s internal structure is similarly fragmented and has not kept
pace with changes in the markets. Its three traditional operating divisions,
Investment Management, Trading and Markets, and Corporation Finance,
organized along the lines of the three major federal securities statutes,
remain isolated from each other. They report to the five-member
Commission, “which has no real coordinating and integrating facilities of
its own.” 195
In March 2008, following disclosure of the enormous losses suffered by
several of the largest brokerage firms from investments backed by defaulted
mortgages, the Treasury Department issued a report containing a
“Blueprint” for regulatory reform. 196 The Treasury proposed that financial
institutions be regulated by four federal agencies: (1) the FRB, which would
be responsible for overall conditions of financial market stability that could
affect the economy; (2) a newly established Prudential Financial Regulatory
Agency, which would impose requirements of capital adequacy, risk
management and the like; (3) a newly established Conduct of Business
Regulatory Agency, which would be responsible for business conduct
across all types of financial firms; and (4) the SEC, which would continue
to be responsible for corporate oversight in public securities markets,
including corporate disclosures, corporate governance, and accounting and
auditing oversight. 197
The Treasury Blueprint of course does not solve the problem of
regulatory fragmentation; it simply fragments regulatory responsibility in a
194. When the CFTC was established in 1974, the majority of futures trading took place in the
agricultural sector; today, it encompasses a vast array of complex financial futures contracts.
195. DAVID SILVER, PRESENTATION AT THE ANNUAL INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
CONFERENCE
(Mar.
22,
2004),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/2000/
2004_0423_Silver.pdf.
196. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 137–38 (Mar. 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/Blueprint.pdf.
197. Id.
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new way. Although it is not at all clear that the recommendations of the
Blueprint will be implemented, the fact that they were made at all is
significant. A year before the SEC’s seventy-fifth birthday, the Treasury
Department proposed that the agency be stripped of most of its regulatory
responsibility, including all authority over the business conduct and
financial responsibility of brokerage firms. But for the low esteem into
which the agency had sunk, even before the demise of several huge
investment banks and the revelation of the Madoff Ponzi scheme, it was
inconceivable that such a proposal would have been made at all.
V. CONCLUSION
I have tried in this article to summarize the history of the SEC, to
pinpoint its principal failures, and to suggest the reasons for the failures.
Although factors such as insufficient resources and inadequate training of
staff members may have played a part in the Commission’s decline, the
main reason, in my opinion, is the ethos of deregulation that has prevailed
during recent years, not just at the SEC but also in the legislature and the
judiciary. In some instances, when the Commission has attempted to assert
regulatory authority over new actors in the market or investment vehicles,
the courts, interpreting the securities laws narrowly, have voided the SEC’s
actions. 198 Congress too, in the so-called Reform Act of 1995, showed far
more concern about frivolous law suits than about protecting investors. 199
The first thing the SEC must do is to recapture its activism of the 1930s
and 1960s. It must continually keep itself familiar with new types of
financial instruments and financial entities, if necessary through in-depth
studies of the particular segments, activities, and actors in the markets. The
new administration should appoint commissioners who believe that strong
regulation benefits not only investors but, in the long run, the securities
industry, the markets, and the economy. Some commissioners might come
from the ranks of state securities regulators, who seem to have been the
only persons with anything resembling the regulatory fervor of the early
days of the Commission.
It might also be beneficial for at least one commissioner to be appointed
from among the ranks of long-term career staff members. This would be a
strong signal that working at the SEC as a lawyer, economist, or accountant
can be a career, not just a job before moving on to Wall Street, a law firm or
a corporation. Despite the staff problems mentioned above and the criticism
198. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (voiding requirement that
hedge fund managers register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Business Roundtable
v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC does not have
authority over stock exchange listing standards).
199. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act is codified in Securities Act of 1933 §27A
(2003) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21E (2004). It was enacted in late 1995 over the
veto of President Clinton.
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leveled over the Madoff affair, the SEC has always had a tradition of a
strong, independent-minded staff, sometimes to the chagrin of the
commissioners. Including a career employee on the Commission would
create closer ties between the Commission and the staff and help keep the
Commission more aware of the problems and issues that the staff faces
every day. 200 Furthermore, academics, including William O. Douglas and
William L. Cary, have been among the most effective past commissioners;
law and business schools continue to be sources of talent.
Most important, the SEC must again see itself as the defender of
investors and a counterweight to securities-industry and corporate lobbyists,
who have the money, the lawyers, and the political influence to defeat or
water down regulatory proposals. On the federal level at least, the SEC is
the investor’s only champion.

200. In the 1960s and 1970s, several career staff members became highly effective
commissioners; one of them, Manuel Cohen, served as SEC Chairman from 1964 to 1969. In
recent years a few commissioners, including Harvey Goldschmid and Annette Nazareth, had
previously served as senior staff members. None of them, however, was a career SEC employee.

